Viola G. Gienger: “Ukrainians reject Russian actions and influence on width, polls have shown.” United States Institute for Peace. March 10, 2015. www.usip.org/publications/2015/03/10/ukrainians-broadly-reject-ru… . The Minsk agreement of September 2014 and its successor in February 2015 are violated by Russia in many respects. But the agreements were signed by the official representative of Ukraine and remain the only documents aimed at ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Young, Thomas. “10 cards that declare Ukraine`s struggle for independence.” Brookings Institution, n.d. www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2015/05/21-ukraine-maps . However, if each leader agreed to sign the agreement, including the President of the United States, it would have sent a stronger message of a common desire for peace (while signaling to local actors that they must support the peace process).

Finally, it would be foolish for Washington not to actively attempt to influence a peace process, especially after being involved in the conflict. As the most powerful country in the world, actively helping the Ukrainian government and theoretically able to provide enough aid to Ukraine to win, America is a joy that must be involved in any peace process. Unfortunately, despite extensive research, there appear to have been no official statements from the US government as to why it did not intervene, and there is little comment from Russia or Ukraine as to why its leaders did not sign. According to one theory, Putin may not have felt the need to sign, and Poroshenko probably did not sign because he feared that it would legitimize rebel groups and for fear of political effects in the face of the unpopularity of the agreement with many Ukrainians. [52] Moreover, this has hardly been analysed by journalists or academics and therefore deserves future research. Immediately after the signing of Minsk II on 12 February 2015, the International Monetary Fund approved a $40 billion bailout package for Ukraine to stabilize its economy in exchange for promises of economic reforms and anti-corruption. [28] At the same time, all the heads of state of the key stakeholders involved, including Russia and the United States, called for restraint. [29] In the three days leading up to the ceasefire on 15 February, the rebels intensified their fighting for other areas. [30] Calls for restraint were also underestimated by the Heads of State, who also expressed skepticism about the peace agreement. [31] In addition, the negotiators indicated that Putin wanted to postpone the ceasefire by ten days, implying that Ukrainian forces, surrounded in the central railway node of Debaltsev√©, would be forced to surrender. [32] In addition, Ukrainian President Poroshenko poured cold water on the agreement, indicating that “no one firmly believes that the conditions of peace signed in Minsk will be strictly enforced”.

[33] The Minsk agreements are also a placebo for Western diplomacy, overwhelmed by crises and requiring tangible results.